6 stories

Quantum Computing and Cryptography

1 Comment and 2 Shares

Quantum computing is a new way of computing -- one that could allow humankind to perform computations that are simply impossible using today's computing technologies. It allows for very fast searching, something that would break some of the encryption algorithms we use today. And it allows us to easily factor large numbers, something that would break the RSA cryptosystem for any key length.

This is why cryptographers are hard at work designing and analyzing "quantum-resistant" public-key algorithms. Currently, quantum computing is too nascent for cryptographers to be sure of what is secure and what isn't. But even assuming aliens have developed the technology to its full potential, quantum computing doesn't spell the end of the world for cryptography. Symmetric cryptography is easy to make quantum-resistant, and we're working on quantum-resistant public-key algorithms. If public-key cryptography ends up being a temporary anomaly based on our mathematical knowledge and computational ability, we'll still survive. And if some inconceivable alien technology can break all of cryptography, we still can have secrecy based on information theory -- albeit with significant loss of capability.

At its core, cryptography relies on the mathematical quirk that some things are easier to do than to undo. Just as it's easier to smash a plate than to glue all the pieces back together, it's much easier to multiply two prime numbers together to obtain one large number than it is to factor that large number back into two prime numbers. Asymmetries of this kind -- one-way functions and trap-door one-way functions -- underlie all of cryptography.

To encrypt a message, we combine it with a key to form ciphertext. Without the key, reversing the process is more difficult. Not just a little more difficult, but astronomically more difficult. Modern encryption algorithms are so fast that they can secure your entire hard drive without any noticeable slowdown, but that encryption can't be broken before the heat death of the universe.

With symmetric cryptography -- the kind used to encrypt messages, files, and drives -- that imbalance is exponential, and is amplified as the keys get larger. Adding one bit of key increases the complexity of encryption by less than a percent (I'm hand-waving here) but doubles the cost to break. So a 256-bit key might seem only twice as complex as a 128-bit key, but (with our current knowledge of mathematics) it's 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 times harder to break.

Public-key encryption (used primarily for key exchange) and digital signatures are more complicated. Because they rely on hard mathematical problems like factoring, there are more potential tricks to reverse them. So you'll see key lengths of 2,048 bits for RSA, and 384 bits for algorithms based on elliptic curves. Here again, though, the costs to reverse the algorithms with these key lengths are beyond the current reach of humankind.

This one-wayness is based on our mathematical knowledge. When you hear about a cryptographer "breaking" an algorithm, what happened is that they've found a new trick that makes reversing easier. Cryptographers discover new tricks all the time, which is why we tend to use key lengths that are longer than strictly necessary. This is true for both symmetric and public-key algorithms; we're trying to future-proof them.

Quantum computers promise to upend a lot of this. Because of the way they work, they excel at the sorts of computations necessary to reverse these one-way functions. For symmetric cryptography, this isn't too bad. Grover's algorithm shows that a quantum computer speeds up these attacks to effectively halve the key length. This would mean that a 256-bit key is as strong against a quantum computer as a 128-bit key is against a conventional computer; both are secure for the foreseeable future.

For public-key cryptography, the results are more dire. Shor's algorithm can easily break all of the commonly used public-key algorithms based on both factoring and the discrete logarithm problem. Doubling the key length increases the difficulty to break by a factor of eight. That's not enough of a sustainable edge.

There are a lot of caveats to those two paragraphs, the biggest of which is that quantum computers capable of doing anything like this don't currently exist, and no one knows when -- or even if ­- we'll be able to build one. We also don't know what sorts of practical difficulties will arise when we try to implement Grover's or Shor's algorithms for anything but toy key sizes. (Error correction on a quantum computer could easily be an unsurmountable problem.) On the other hand, we don't know what other techniques will be discovered once people start working with actual quantum computers. My bet is that we will overcome the engineering challenges, and that there will be many advances and new techniques­but they're going to take time to discover and invent. Just as it took decades for us to get supercomputers in our pockets, it will take decades to work through all the engineering problems necessary to build large-enough quantum computers.

In the short term, cryptographers are putting considerable effort into designing and analyzing quantum-resistant algorithms, and those are likely to remain secure for decades. This is a necessarily slow process, as both good cryptanalysis transitioning standards take time. Luckily, we have time. Practical quantum computing seems to always remain "ten years in the future," which means no one has any idea.

After that, though, there is always the possibility that those algorithms will fall to aliens with better quantum techniques. I am less worried about symmetric cryptography, where Grover's algorithm is basically an upper limit on quantum improvements, than I am about public-key algorithms based on number theory, which feel more fragile. It's possible that quantum computers will someday break all of them, even those that today are quantum resistant.

If that happens, we will face a world without strong public-key cryptography. That would be a huge blow to security and would break a lot of stuff we currently do, but we could adapt. In the 1980s, Kerberos was an all-symmetric authentication and encryption system. More recently, the GSM cellular standard does both authentication and key distribution -- at scale -- with only symmetric cryptography. Yes, those systems have centralized points of trust and failure, but it's possible to design other systems that use both secret splitting and secret sharing to minimize that risk. (Imagine that a pair of communicants get a piece of their session key from each of five different key servers.) The ubiquity of communications also makes things easier today. We can use out-of-band protocols where, for example, your phone helps you create a key for your computer. We can use in-person registration for added security, maybe at the store where you buy your smartphone or initialize your Internet service. Advances in hardware may also help to secure keys in this world. I'm not trying to design anything here, only to point out that there are many design possibilities. We know that cryptography is all about trust, and we have a lot more techniques to manage trust than we did in the early years of the Internet. Some important properties like forward secrecy will be blunted and far more complex, but as long as symmetric cryptography still works, we'll still have security.

It's a weird future. Maybe the whole idea of number theory­based encryption, which is what our modern public-key systems are, is a temporary detour based on our incomplete model of computing. Now that our model has expanded to include quantum computing, we might end up back to where we were in the late 1970s and early 1980s: symmetric cryptography, code-based cryptography, Merkle hash signatures. That would be both amusing and ironic.

Yes, I know that quantum key distribution is a potential replacement for public-key cryptography. But come on -- does anyone expect a system that requires specialized communications hardware and cables to be useful for anything but niche applications? The future is mobile, always-on, embedded computing devices. Any security for those will necessarily be software only.

There's one more future scenario to consider, one that doesn't require a quantum computer. While there are several mathematical theories that underpin the one-wayness we use in cryptography, proving the validity of those theories is in fact one of the great open problems in computer science. Just as it is possible for a smart cryptographer to find a new trick that makes it easier to break a particular algorithm, we might imagine aliens with sufficient mathematical theory to break all encryption algorithms. To us, today, this is ridiculous. Public- key cryptography is all number theory, and potentially vulnerable to more mathematically inclined aliens. Symmetric cryptography is so much nonlinear muddle, so easy to make more complex, and so easy to increase key length, that this future is unimaginable. Consider an AES variant with a 512-bit block and key size, and 128 rounds. Unless mathematics is fundamentally different than our current understanding, that'll be secure until computers are made of something other than matter and occupy something other than space.

But if the unimaginable happens, that would leave us with cryptography based solely on information theory: one-time pads and their variants. This would be a huge blow to security. One-time pads might be theoretically secure, but in practical terms they are unusable for anything other than specialized niche applications. Today, only crackpots try to build general-use systems based on one-time pads -- and cryptographers laugh at them, because they replace algorithm design problems (easy) with key management and physical security problems (much, much harder). In our alien-ridden science-fiction future, we might have nothing else.

Against these godlike aliens, cryptography will be the only technology we can be sure of. Our nukes might refuse to detonate and our fighter jets might fall out of the sky, but we will still be able to communicate securely using one-time pads. There's an optimism in that.

This essay origially appeared in IEEE Security and Privacy.

Read the whole story
4 days ago
Share this story
1 public comment
4 days ago
A great overview of what quantum computing appears to mean for crypto, er, cryptograpy. (ugh I hate how you have to write "cryptography" because "crypto" somehow got coopted by coin bros)

But, come on—as long as we're positing aliens who can break an infinite key size AES variant computationally, I don't know why number-theoretic cryptosystems stand. One Time Pads depend on random numbers, and sufficiently advanced aliens would be able to control or predict the output of any physical RNG, even if we think have a physics-based proof that it's impossible. (worst case, they just have to simulate the whole universe to do it..)
Earth, Sol system, Western spiral arm
4 days ago
I realize this is old-man-yells-at-cloud territory but I refuse to cede “crypto” to the tulip bulb fetishists

Internet Publication of 3D Printing Files About Guns: Facts and What’s at Stake

1 Share

When it comes to guns, nearly everyone has strong views. When it comes to Internet publication of 3D printed guns, those strong views can push courts and regulators into making hasty, dangerous legal precedents that will hurt the public's ability to discuss legal, important, and even urgent topics ranging from mass surveillance to treatment of tear gas attacks. Careless responses to 3D-printed guns, even those that will do little to limit their availability, will have long-lasting effects on a host of activities entirely unrelated to guns.

In its responses to 3D printed guns, the U.S. Department of State and state Attorneys General have sought to brush aside the legal protections that ensure your right to dissent and to publish technological information and software for privacy and other purposes. That’s why we’re working to make sure that 3D printing cases don’t set precedents that chip away at your freedoms to speak and learn online.

Here's how we got to this moment. In 2012, the first order to de-publish the well-known, non-classified 3D design files for guns came about when the federal government decided that it could use existing export regulations to censor technical information whenever it deemed that censorship was “advisable.” The regulations, which are not normally aimed at speech, had no objective legal standards, no judicial oversight, and no binding deadlines. This decision was applied to a company called Defense Distributed and its founder, Cody Wilson.

Last month, after years of litigation, the federal government decided that, contrary to its view in 2012, the export restrictions should not apply to the publication of 3D printer files for guns on the Internet. In response, state governments have persuaded a federal court to order the takedown of that information from the Internet without any First Amendment analysis. They have also asked the federal government to reinstate the system that gave it total discretion over Internet publication of technical information about 3D printed guns, which it enforced against Defense Distributed but not against other publishers.

Experts have different views on on whether the government could meet the appropriate First Amendment standard with carefully-tailored measures designed to address the 3D printing of guns. But whether or not you think the government could satisfy the necessary legal test in a hypothetical case, it’s critical that the government not be able to skip that step and jump straight to the de-publication of speech.

Our government has a history of characterizing information (like encryption technology) and ideas (like socialism or Islam) as dangerous and likely to lead to violence. A free society cannot give the government unbridled discretion to make those choices, because of the systematic oppression that such a government can engage in.

A Brief Explainer on Making Guns, via 3D Printer and Otherwise

Most of us are not familiar with the process of manufacturing a gun, but there are many tutorials available both offline and online for doing so, as well as multiple sources for designs that could be used in a 3D printer. Federal law and many states permit a person to engage in gunsmithing, creating an unlicensed, unregistered firearm for their own use. The materials are generally not difficult to buy either. While making guns is allowed many places, whether the firearm is made through 3D printing or by simply buying and assembling the materials, it is generally unlawful to sell or distribute the unmarked firearms you make without a license.

Most of the files at issue in the Defense Distributed case are “Computer Aided Design” (CAD) files, a type of file that engineers use describe three-dimensional objects. Programs like “Slic3r” can interpret these shapes and figure out the path that a 3D printer would have to move its nozzle, or a milling machine would have to move its cutter, to form that object. Slic3r creates a 3D print file that can then be understood by the machine itself and used by its operator to create an object.

Once you’ve got your 3D printer or milling machine, your raw materials, the software to run it, and the design files, you can tell the machine to make whatever shapes you want, including shapes that can be assembled into a gun. You can’t print bullets, of course – you need to buy them or acquire gunpowder to make your own.

So, following all these steps, it is possible to 3D print or CNC mill a gun, go acquire bullets, and fire it.

Your 3D-printed gun will likely be made of plastic. This is not an ideal material for a gun, because it is weak and it melts, but plastic guns are capable of firing. The plastic part will not be detectable by metal detectors, but would be detectable by the scanners at airport security. And it's illegal under the Undetectable Firearms Act to manufacture an entirely plastic gun unless you insert a bar of metal that can be detected by a metal detector.

A CNC-milled gun can be made of metal, and this is the more relevant technology because metal is more suitable for guns. Most of the parts of guns are unregulated, so realistically, a person would buy the unregulated parts, print the regulated ones, and then assemble the weapon. A CNC mill that can generate the regulated lower receiver of an AR-15, for instance, costs about $1700. The raw metal for the lower receiver costs under $30.

Neither CNC nor 3D printing is needed to make guns, however. As a simpler alternative to milling the entire shape yourself, you can purchase an unregulated lower receiver that is not quite finished for about $75 and drill some simple holes and a trough into it with an inexpensive drill press, without the need for an automatic milling machine.

If someone wants to use the more complex, more expensive 3D printing or CNC process to make a gun, however, the files that describe the gun shapes you would need to print are available in several places on the Internet, both inside and outside the U.S. The most simple designs have been around for over seven years.

The process surrounding the publication and de-publication of these designs is a precedent that is simply dangerous to speech. It allows the government to use export regulations to censor speech on the Internet in a way they are not allowed to do for books, magazines, and any other hard copy of designs. Granting a censorship power that broad will lead to speech being taken down for political reasons, and a mechanism must be in place to prevent that. Following that power with requests to remove the information globally extends the potential for harm to speech.

Export Regulations Gave the Government Unchecked Power to Censor Technical Speech Online

In 2012, the government told Cody Wilson's Defense Distributed that it could not publish designs for firearms online. Despite the fact that many others had already published similar information, the government told Defense Distributed that it had to apply for an export license in order to publish the computer files because some of the files can be interpreted by a 3D printer to create a gun.

The government's reasoning stemmed from an interpretation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which gave the government authority to restrict the export of technologies with potential military applications. Under the government’s definition, “export” encompasses not only sending physical items overseas, but also publishing information on the Internet about certain technologies.

These regulations don't restrict publication in a magazine or book, or mailing USB sticks with files on them, because they generally permit publication of this kind of information into the “public domain.”

If you wanted to publish online about gun designs, or how to diagnose a biological weapon attack, or treat chemical weapon injuries, then under the government's reasoning, you were supposed to ask permission first. The Internet, argued the government, is not the “public domain” because it is accessible to foreigners, and therefore constitutes an export. The Department of State would then decide – with no binding legal standards, no deadline for a decision, and no judicial oversight – whether to permit you to publish or not.

The massive list of covered technologies encompasses certain medical information and devices, certain types of GPS technologies, and jet engines, just to name a few. The materials on the list have obvious, legitimate applications for researchers, manufacturers, journalists, hobbyists, and many others. There are no rules ensuring that the government doesn’t unfairly bar certain speakers for political reasons, and there’s no opportunity to appeal the government’s decision to a court.

Defense Distributed applied for a license (EFF helped advise the company at this juncture and helped it to get experienced export counsel). After a lengthy delay, the government denied the license, and the appeal dragged on without any binding deadline. After waiting for an answer for many months, Defense Distributed finally sued and lost preliminary arguments in both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeal (EFF did not represent them, and instead filed an amicus brief addressing the First Amendment issues posed by the speech-licensing regime). Last month, the government reversed course and not only granted Defense Distributed a license, but changed the regulations to allow publication of Defense Distributed’s materials.

Broad Censorship Powers Lead to Politically Motivated Takedowns

It’s dangerous for the Executive Branch to have so much control over the public’s right to share information online. Without meaningful restrictions on how and when the State Department can exercise its power, the risk of politically motivated censorship is extremely high.

Indeed, it is quite possible that both the previous administration's decision to deny Defense Distributed a license and the current government's change in policy were motivated in part by Wilson's political opinions and often inflammatory comments. It's telling that other groups were publishing similar information online at the same time that Defense Distributed was barred from it.

It’s dangerous for the Executive Branch to have so much control over the public’s right to share information online.

In absence of laws dictating when the government can and can’t use this power, politically motivated censorship is unavoidable. As EFF argued in our amicus brief, echoing concerns raised by the Supreme Court, “Human nature creates an unacceptably high risk that excessive discretion will be used unconstitutionally, and such violations would be very difficult to prove on a case-by-case basis.” Under the same law, the government could try to bar activists from sharing instructions for treating the effects of tear gas and other chemical weapons, or researchers from spreading information about the government’s use of mass surveillance tools.

Or it could bar technologists from publishing the encryption technologies that we all use to protect ourselves from criminals online. In the 1990s, EFF successfully argued that it was unconstitutional for the government to use these export regulations to ban the online distribution of computer code used for effective encryption. Two decades later, the government has again used this unconstitutional export control regime in a way that gives it broad control over who can share information about a wide range of technologies online, with no safeguards ensuring that it doesn’t ban certain speakers for political reasons.

New Lawsuits Seek Global Takedown Orders That Would Erode Protections for All Instructive Speech

The new lawsuits brought by state Attorneys General are concerning for a different reason: they ask the courts to remove the published files because other people might use the information they contain to make guns illegally or make legal guns and use them illegally.

The cases are not based on gun control laws, because states can’t impose their own law on the rest of the country and Federal gun control law permits personal gunsmithing. Instead, the state claims include common law nuisance and negligence, while the claims in Federal court argue that the Department of State did not follow the Administrative Procedures Act and justify why it changed its mind.

Normally, you cannot be prevented from saying something merely because someone else might use that information to commit a crime, or even because they might be persuaded to commit a crime. Unless your speech rises to the level of a conspiracy to commit a crime or speech that incites people to immediate violence, then the legal responsibility falls on the people who decide to break the law.

Even when heady interests such as national security or physical harm are potentially at stake, the government has a heavy burden to prove the urgency of the harm and the appropriateness of a speech restriction as the proper remedy. It’s generally not appropriate to order one person not to publish material that is readily available elsewhere.

The government has a history of characterizing ideas as dangerous in an attempt to suppress speech about those technologies and ideas. First Amendment standards ensure that speech cannot be suppressed as an easy measure of first resort, or where those speech constraints aren’t necessary to address a proven harm or effective at addressing that harm.

If the states in this case are successful, they will bypass legal doctrines that we rely on to protect your right to encrypt and your right to advocate for social change. The arguments from the states are clear on this point – the states are arguing that the government should be required to prevent publication because foreigners abroad might do things that the U.S. opposes and they are arguing that the courts themselves should order the designs to be kept offline because people might make the guns and use them in domestic crimes.

These arguments are dangerous because they threaten to empower current (and future) U.S. government officials to play pre-publication gatekeeper of what information you can publish online based on the barest, unproven claim of national interest or the possibility that others might use your information to further crimes. It could bar us from publishing and discussing artificial intelligence technologies, something that has increasing importance to our online lives and even how the government makes decisions about bail and sentencing. It could censor information about how to survive a chemical weapons attack. It could force us to compromise our secure communications technologies, making our personal information vulnerable to unlawful surveillance and identity theft.

EFF will continue to protect your freedom to teach one another new skills and share code with each other, so that others can learn and benefit from your ingenuity. We will continue to protect your freedom to advocate for ideas the government labels as dangerous. Not because we agree with every idea that’s out there, but because of the clear danger posed by a government that grants itself unbridled power to decide whose ideas are dangerous and what knowledge should be deleted from the Internet.

Read the whole story
47 days ago
Share this story

Twitter to All Users: Change Your Password Now!

1 Share

Twitter just asked all 300+ million users to reset their passwords, citing the exposure of user passwords via a bug that stored passwords in plain text — without protecting them with any sort of encryption technology that would mask a Twitter user’s true password. The social media giant says it has fixed the bug and that so far its investigation hasn’t turned up any signs of a breach or that anyone misused the information. But if you have a Twitter account, please change your account password now.

Or if you don’t trust links in blogs like this (I get it) go to Twitter.com and change it from there. And then come back and read the rest of this. We’ll wait.

In a post to its company blog this afternoon, Twitter CTO Parag Agrawal wrote:

“When you set a password for your Twitter account, we use technology that masks it so no one at the company can see it. We recently identified a bug that stored passwords unmasked in an internal log. We have fixed the bug, and our investigation shows no indication of breach or misuse by anyone.

A message posted this afternoon (and still present as a pop-up) warns all users to change their passwords.

“Out of an abundance of caution, we ask that you consider changing your password on all services where you’ve used this password. You can change your Twitter password anytime by going to the password settings page.”

Agrawal explains that Twitter normally masks user passwords through a state-of-the-art encryption technology called “bcrypt,” which replaces the user’s password with a random set of numbers and letters that are stored in Twitter’s system.

“This allows our systems to validate your account credentials without revealing your password,” said Agrawal, who says the technology they’re using to mask user passwords is the industry standard.

“Due to a bug, passwords were written to an internal log before completing the hashing process,” he continued. “We found this error ourselves, removed the passwords, and are implementing plans to prevent this bug from happening again.”

Agrawal wrote that while Twitter has no reason to believe password information ever left Twitter’s systems or was misused by anyone, the company is still urging all Twitter users to reset their passwords NOW.

A letter to all Twitter users posted by Twitter CTO Parag Agrawal

Twitter advises:
-Change your password on Twitter and on any other service where you may have used the same password.
-Use a strong password that you don’t reuse on other websites.
Enable login verification, also known as two factor authentication. This is the single best action you can take to increase your account security.
-Use a password manager to make sure you’re using strong, unique passwords everywhere.

This may be much ado about nothing disclosed out of an abundance of caution, or further investigation may reveal different findings. It doesn’t matter for right now: If you’re a Twitter user and if you didn’t take my advice to go change your password yet, go do it now! That is, if you can.

Twitter.com seems responsive now, but some period of time Thursday afternoon Twitter had problems displaying many Twitter profiles, or even its homepage. Just a few moments ago, I tried to visit the Twitter CTO’s profile page and got this (ditto for Twitter.com):

What KrebsOnSecurity and other Twitter users got when we tried to visit twitter.com and the Twitter CTO’s profile page late in the afternoon ET on May 3, 2018.

If for some reason you can’t reach Twitter.com, try again soon. Put it on your to-do list or calendar for an hour from now. Seriously, do it now or very soon.

And please don’t use a password that you have used for any other account you use online, either in the past or in the present. A non-comprehensive list (note to self) of some password tips are here.

I have sent some more specific questions about this incident in to Twitter. More updates as available.

Update, 8:04 p.m. ET: Went to reset my password at Twitter and it said my new password was strong, but when I submitted it I was led to a dead page. But after logging in again at twitter.com the new password worked (and the old didn’t anymore). Then it prompted me to enter one-time code from app (you do have 2-factor set up on Twitter, right?) Password successfully changed!

Read the whole story
137 days ago
Share this story

Shall we buy MacBooks to look cool but install Ubuntu on them?

3 Comments and 16 Shares

by @juan_domenech

Read the whole story
1801 days ago
Share this story
3 public comments
1791 days ago
1800 days ago
It'll cost more than a perfectly adequate T-series laptop, and you can't get a mac with ultranav. Case closed. Also, you have to install Debian for the ideological purity.
Earth, Sol system, Western spiral arm
1801 days ago
This is totally me.
Slateford, United Kingdom

Microsoft Word considered harmful

2 Comments and 4 Shares

Charlie Stross really, really hates Microsoft Word. So much so that he's written a 1600-word essay laying out the case for Word as a great destroyer of creativity, an agent of anticompetitive economic destruction, and an enemy of all that's decent and right in the world. It's actually a pretty convincing argument.

As the product grew, Microsoft deployed their embrace-and-extend tactic to force users to upgrade, locking them into Word, by changing the file format the program used on a regular basis. Early versions of Word interoperated well with rivals such as Word Perfect, importing and exporting other programs' file formats. But as Word's domination became established, Microsoft changed the file format repeatedly -- with Word 95, Word 97, in 2000, and again in 2003 and more recently. Each new version of Word defaulted to writing a new format of file which could not be parsed by older copies of the program. If you had to exchange documents with anyone else, you could try to get them to send and receive RTF — but for the most part casual business users never really got the hang of different file formats in the "Save As ..." dialog, and so if you needed to work with others you had to pay the Microsoft Danegeld on a regular basis, even if none of the new features were any use to you. The .doc file format was also obfuscated, deliberately or intentionally: rather than a parseable document containing formatting and macro metadata, it was effectively a dump of the in-memory data structures used by word, with pointers to the subroutines that provided formatting or macro support. And "fast save" made the picture worse, by appending a journal of changes to the application's in-memory state. To parse a .doc file you virtually have to write a mini-implementation of Microsoft Word. This isn't a data file format: it's a nightmare! In the 21st century they tried to improve the picture by replacing it with an XML schema ... but somehow managed to make things worse, by using XML tags that referred to callbacks in the Word codebase, rather than representing actual document semantics. It's hard to imagine a corporation as large and [usually] competently-managed as Microsoft making such a mistake by accident ...

Why Microsoft Word must Die


Read the whole story
1802 days ago
Share this story
2 public comments
1801 days ago
can't say he's wrong... open office is a good replacement!
Burlington, Ontario
1802 days ago
Word reached its zenith with Word 5.1a for Macintosh.
New York, NY

The Doctor Who theme song, performed on Tesla coils


Yes, you read that correctly. And yes, it's every bit as excellent as it sounds.


Read the whole story
1997 days ago
Share this story